Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing? by Blair, Margaret
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law 
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing? 
Margaret Blair 
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Margaret Blair, Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?, 105 Cornell Law Review. 641 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1175 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Feb 10 16:32:15 2021
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
			                                                                
Margaret M. Blair, Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 641 (2020).                                                                     
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Blair, M. M., Are publicly traded corporations disappearing?, 105(3) Cornell L. Rev.
641 (2020).                                                                          
APA 7th ed.                                                                          
Blair, M. M. (2020). Are publicly traded corporations disappearing?. Cornell Law
Review, 105(3), 641-674.                                                             
Chicago 17th ed.                                                                     
Margaret M. Blair, "Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?," Cornell Law
Review 105, no. 3 (March 2020): 641-674                                              
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Margaret M Blair, "Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?" (2020) 105:3
Cornell L Rev 641.                                                                   
AGLC 4th ed.                                                                         
Margaret M Blair, 'Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?' (2020) 105(3)
Cornell Law Review 641.                                                              
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Blair, Margaret M. "Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?." Cornell Law
Review, vol. 105, no. 3, March 2020, p. 641-674. HeinOnline.                         
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Margaret M Blair, 'Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?' (2020) 105 Cornell
L Rev 641
Provided by: 
Vanderbilt University Law School
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
   Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
ARE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS
DISAPPEARING?
Margaret M. Blairt
Corporate law scholars and economists have expressed
concern recently about the fact that the number of publicly
traded corporations in the United States has declined signifi-
cantly since a peak in the late 1990s. In this Essay, in honor
of the late Professor Lynn Stout, who devoted much of her
career to the study of large publicly traded corporations, I
show that despite a decline in the number of such corporations
in the last two decades, they collectively account for about the
same share of total economic activity as they have for the last
six decades. While there has been turnover in the ranks of the
largest corporations in recent decades, there is no reason to
believe that these entities are disappearing or becoming less
important.
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A substantial part of Professor Lynn Stout's scholarly work
during the last decade or two of her life was devoted to the
study of corporations and corporate law. Though much of what
she wrote applied to closely held corporations as well as pub-
licly traded corporations, she most frequently aimed her sharp
quill at the boards, managers, and shareholders of large pub-
t Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise, and the FedEx Chair for
Research at Vanderbilt University Law School. The author also was a co-author
with Professor Lynn Stout on a number of articles.
The author would like to thank research assistants Hydn Park and Jingwei
Fan for their help in wrangling data. Most figures in this Article are based on
author's calculations from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), Compustat
Annual Updates, WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., wrds.wharton.upenn.edu [https://
perma.cc/P8HG-EBRY] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). Author's calculations from
WRDS data were all done prior to the COVID-19 market disruptions.
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licly traded corporations. In the last couple of years, however,
a number of scholars have argued that publicly traded corpora-
tions are dying. "Is the U.S. Public Corporation in Trouble?,"1
asked one of the earliest of a recent spate of articles raising this
concern. Others reference The Vanishing American Corpora-
tion, "The Disappearing Corporation in the New Economy,"
"The Rise and Fall (?) of the Berle-Means Corporation," and the
"Decline of the Public Company."2 These articles all point to a
decline in the number of corporations that are tapping into the
public equity markets to go public through initial public offer-
ings (IPOs), and an accompanying decline, at least from levels
of the late 1990s, in the number of United States-based pub-
licly traded corporations.
A few scholars have rebutted these concerns.3 As Brian
Cheffins puts it, "Rumours of the Death of the American Public
Company are Greatly Exaggerated."4 While simple counts of
the number of publicly traded corporations listed on stock ex-
changes in the United States suggest that some kind of trans-
formation in the corporate sector may be happening, it would
be misleading to conclude that publicly traded corporations are
becoming less important in the overall economy. In this Arti-
1 Kathleen Kahle & Rene M. Stulz, Is the U.S. Public Corporation in Trouble?,
31 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 67, 88 (2017). A 2016 working paper version of this article
was titled Is the American Public Corporation in Trouble? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 22857, 2016).
2 GERALD F. DAVIS, THE vANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE
HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY (2016); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of
Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445
(2017); Gerald Davis, Post-Corporate: The Disappearing Corporation in the New
Economy, THIRD WAY (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/post-cor-
porate-the-disappearing-corporation-in-the-new-economy [https://perma.cc/
QL5C-HWGH]; Brian Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of the Berle-Means Corporation
(Univ. of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 50/2018,
2018); see also Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & Rene M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing
Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 464 (2017) ("Relative to other countries, the United
States now has abnormally few listed firms."); Craig Doidge, Kathleen M. Kahle, G.
Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Eclipse of the Public Corporation or Eclipse of the
Public Markets (ECGI Finance, Working Paper No. 547/2018, 2018) ("Since ...
1997, the number of listed firms .. . has fallen in every year but one.").
3 See, e.g., Scott D. Anthony et al., 2018 Corporate Longevity Forecast: Crea-
tive Destruction is Accelerating, INNOSIGHT (Feb. 2018), https://
www.innosight.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11 /Innosight-Corporate-Lon-
gevity-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGN9-JCY3] (arguing that "tracking all the
additions and deletions from the S&P 500 over the past half century . .. shows
that lifespans of companies tend to fluctuate in cycles that often mirror the state
of the economy," but that new companies have replaced exiting companies "by
creating new products, business models, and serving new customers").
4 Brian R. Cheffins, Rumours of the Death of the American Public Company




cle, I briefly trace the share of total economic activity in the
United States accounted for by the largest publicly traded cor-
porations over the last six decades, and compare this to the
findings of several studies purporting to measure such activity
going back to the early 1900s. What I show is that, since early
in the twentieth century, the largest corporations, which have
nearly always been publicly traded, have accounted for one-
third to one-half of aggregate economic activity (depending on
how that is measured), and that, generally, the share of eco-
nomic activity accounted for by the largest corporations ap-
pears to be remarkably stable over time. Data from some
studies done in the 1930s and 1940s suggest that large pub-
licly traded corporations may have represented a somewhat
larger proportion of economic activity in the United States in
the first half of the twentieth century than they have in the last
six decades. But there is no strong downward trend since the
1960s. Indeed, the market capitalization of publicly traded
corporations has risen significantly relative to GDP and relative
to all nonfinancial corporate assets.
In Part I below, I briefly review the history of the large
publicly traded corporation in the United States in the first half
of the twentieth century. In Part II, I review data on the evolu-
tion of the role of large corporations in the U.S. economy since
about 1960. The data I present confirm what other scholars
have observed, which is a recent decline in the number of cor-
porations traded in the public markets, and in the number of
firms going public via an IPO. But that decline in the number
of corporations and in the number of IPOs does not correspond
to a decline in economic significance of the publicly traded
corporate sector. In fact, if anything, the publicly traded cor-
porate sector has grown relative to various measures of eco-
nomic activity.
In Part III, I discuss some of the reasons why the simple
counts of publicly traded corporations have gone down. One
important reason is the emergence of institutions that help to
funnel capital to small and mid-sized corporations, so that go-
ing to public markets for capital is not as urgent as it may have
been in the past. A second reason may be that corporations
have lately been merging and consolidating to create huge
firms that are ever more dominant in their industries. I argue
that these reasons do not suggest hat publicly traded corpora-
tions are less important in the economy. In fact, large publicly
traded corporations are as important to the overall economy as
they ever were, and may be exercising more market power.
2020] 643
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Finally, I show that, while publicly traded corporations are
as large and important to the economy as they ever have been,
the nature of the assets they control is changing in ways that
may dramatically affect how corporations behave, and the role
that they play, as employers and as social institutions.
I
EMERGENCE OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY TRADED
CORPORATION, 1900-1960
A merger wave that swept through the corporate sector in
the decade from 1895 to 1905 transformed the structure and
functioning of the entire U.S. economy. By 1905, at least 1,800
business firms had disappeared into "consolidations," as the
giant, newly merged corporations were called.5 The turn-of-
the-century consolidations occurred mainly in industries
where technological developments in the late nineteenth cen-
tury had made mass production feasible, and entrepreneurs
had added capacity so quickly that, collectively, they overbuilt
their markets.6 As supply began to exceed demand in many
industries, firm owners first formed "pools" or "trusts" to try to
keep prices from falling.7 Within a few years, to avoid running
afoul of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,8 corporations
merged rather than just collaborating with each other.
Lamoreaux documented ninety-three consolidations, and
found that, by 1904, seventy-two corporations controlled at
least 40% of their industries nationwide, and of these, forty-two
controlled at least 70% of their industries.9 These consolida-
tions followed the pattern that had been set by the railroads
during the late nineteenth century, when hundreds of small,
short-line railroads were connected and merged into systems
that eventually stretched across the entire country.10
At its inception, thus, the twentieth century saw a sharp
reduction in the number of corporations in existence, but a
5 NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS,
1895-1904, at 1-2 (1985).
6 Id. at 45. Lamoreaux's analysis in Chapter 3, id. at 46-86, makes this
point.
7 Id. at 45 ("Normal collusive arrangements proved utterly incapable of stem-
ming this virulent competition. So, as we shall see, did the increasingly sophisti-
cated and formal pools that the manufacturers devised. By the end of the decade,
only consolidation seemed to offer a chance for relief.").
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).
9 LAMOREAUX, supra note 5, at 1-2.
10 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Railroad: Pioneers in Modern Corporate
Management, 39 Bus. HIST. REv. 16, 16 (1965) (arguing that administrative solu-
tions to railroad consolidation paved the way for modern corporate structures).
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new presence in the economy of giant corporations that con-
trolled large shares of market in many industries.11 The public
was generally fearful about the implications of this, and schol-
ars, activists, and federal enforcement authorities fretted about
what to do. From 1897-1900, according to a survey of the
literature by economist Charles Bullock in 1901, at least thirty-
four books, reports, and pamphlets, and more than 100 period-
ical articles appeared addressing the problem of monopoly.12
Between 1900 and 1914, the Roosevelt Administration and the
Taft Administration filed more than 130 lawsuits against cor-
porations under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 13 Two prominent
cases, one against Standard Oil, 14 and the other against Ameri-
can Tobacco,15 both ended in 1911 with the breakup of the
targeted combinations into multiple smaller companies, al-
though a number of other consolidations, such as U.S. Steel,
survived antitrust challenges.16 In 1914, Congress passed
both the Clayton Antitrust Act17 and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,18 strengthening the ability of the federal govern-
ment to restrain the activities of the largest corporations. This
period was, as one scholar put it, "the golden age of
antitrust."19
How big were these huge new corporations, relative to their
industries and to the economy as a whole? Despite intense
public concern about giant corporations and Congressional in-
quiries into industrial consolidations, there was no systematic
attempt at the federal level to collect data on the corporate
sector at the turn of the century.20 In 1900, however, John
Moody published the first of many "Moody's Manuals," which
"1 See LAMOREAUx, supra note 5, at 5.
12 Charles J. Bullock, Trust Literature: A Survey and a Criticism, 15 Q.J.
ECON. 167, 167-68 (1901).
13 Morton Keller, Public Policy and Large Enterprise. Comparative Historical
Perspectives, in RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG DER GROSSUNTERNEHMEN IM 19. UND FROHEN
20. JAHRHUNDERT [LAW AND THE FORMATION OF THE BIG ENTERPRISES IN THE 19TH AND
EARLY 20TH CENTURIES] 515, 527 (Norbert Horn & Jnrgen Kocka eds., 1979).
14 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
15 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
16 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
17 Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012).
18 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012).
19 Keller, supra note 13, at 527.
20 The federal government began collecting census data on manufacturing
establishments as early as 1810. See History, Economic Census, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/economic/eco-
nomiccensushtml [https://perma.cc/9KCV-V358] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
These data were not aggregated to produce firm-level data until after 1900. See
Anthony Patrick O'Brien, Factory Size, Economies of Scale, and the Great Merger
Wave of 1898-1902, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 639, 639-49 (1988).
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listed securities that traded on exchanges in New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, Chicago, and several smaller cities.2 1 That man-
ual reported that there were nearly 1,800 corporations with
publicly traded securities in existence in that year, many of
which had been formed through consolidations that had taken
place in the previous three years. These corporations had total
capitalization of $9.325 billion.22 To put this in perspective,
this represented almost 45% of the $20.766 billion estimated
GDP of the entire country in 1900.23
Studies of the degree to which individual corporations
dominated certain industries after the turn of the century indi-
cate that, while concentration had increased significantly by
1905 in some sectors, such as oil (dominated by Standard Oil),
steel (dominated by U.S. Steel), and telecommunications (domi-
nated by American Telephone and Telegraph), some of the con-
solidations were subsequently broken up by court action (e.g.,
Standard Oil), and, in a number of industries, the consolida-
tions failed on their own. 2 4 The Distilling and Cattle Feeding
Company (later renamed American Spirits Manufacturing), for
example, bought up many of its competitors in 1890, giving it a
large share of market and a position on the original list of
corporations in the Dow Jones Industrial index for a while.25
But new competitors entered almost as soon as it was consoli-
dated, challenging its dominance in the industry, according to
Lamoreaux.26 U.S. Rubber had a similar experience. Lamo-
21 MOODY'S MANUAL OF INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS SECURmES 47 (John
Moody ed., 1900).
22 Dollar values are unadjusted for inflation unless otherwise stated.
23 See Louis Johnston & Samuel H. Williamson, What Was the U.S. GDP
Then?, MEASURINGWORH, https://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/usgdp/
[https://perma.cc/BL5B-SP5W] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). When considering
how big corporations are, we need to consider how size should be measured, and
"relative to what?" My purpose in this Article is to paint a broad picture of how
large the largest corporations were in the past, and are today, relative to various
measures of aggregate economic activity. I have tried to use measures for which
data are available over time, and reasonably reliable. So, while it is not ideal to
compare the capitalization of corporations that were tracked by "Moody's Manual"
to GDP (since the former is a stock and the latter a flow), there are no comparable
data readily available for something like the value of all industrial assets for 1900.
24 See LAMOREAUX, supra note 5, at 2-5, 180-81.
25 See id. at 181. Charles Dow first calculated what became the Dow Jones
Industrial Average in 1896. See Dow Jones Industrial Average, WIKIPEDIA, https:/
/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DowJonesIndustrialAverage [https://perma.cc/
BD9M-ML6E] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
26 LAMOREAUx, supra note 5, at 181-82. American Spirit Manufacturing did
not die, however, and continued to control more than seventy distilleries by 1920
at the beginning of the Prohibition Era. After the repeal of Prohibition in 1934,
American Spirit Manufacturing again became part of the Dow index for a while.
See Alex Planes, What Happened to the First 12 Stocks on the Dow?, MOTLEY FOOL
646 [Vol. 105:641
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reaux argues that those firms that were able to maintain their
dominance did so either by being more efficient than competi-
tors, or by getting control of upstream sources of scarce in-
puts.27 Thus, after the wave of consolidations ended, some
scholars have argued that the overall concentration of produc-
tive capacity and activity declined somewhat during the period
from 1905 to 1920.28 Concentration may have continued to
increase in some industries, however.29 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the position of the leading corporation in any given in-
dustry was not necessarily a stable one, with the turnover rate
relatively high among the largest firms, according to economist
Richard Edwards.3 0
More concerning, perhaps, than the apparent concentra-
tion of economic power in certain large corporations, was the
fact that many of the important turn-of-the-century consolida-
tions had been facilitated by a very small group of investment
banks, the most important of which was J.P. Morgan & Co.
Investment bankers from these firms had assumed positions
on the boards of directors of the largest and most important
corporations in the country. The Banking and Currency Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives (Pujo Committee) re-
port, published in 1913, found that a mere 180 individuals
held 341 directorships in 112 major corporations in the manu-
facturing, transportation, mining, telecommunications, and fi-
nancial industries, and that these individuals were nearly all
linked to each other through their ties to investment bankers
J.P. Morgan, George F. Baker, and James Stillman, as well as
to the banks and trust companies with which they were
affiliated.3 1
(Apr. 9, 2013, 11:33 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/04/
09/what-happened-to-the-first-12-stocks-on-the-dow.aspx [https://perma.cc/
AK92-EVZ3].
27 LAMOREAUX, supra note 5, at 189.
28 See Richard C. Edwards, Stages in Corporate Stability and the Risks of
Corporate Failure, 35 J. ECON. HIST. 428, 438-39 (1975).
29 A number of scholars examined the increases in the concentration of eco-
nomic activity in specific industries that resulted from the turn-of-century merger
waves. See, e.g., WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORPORATIONS (1905) (exam-
ining the formation of trusts, pools, and corporations in American industry).
30 Edwards, supra note 28, at 435 tbl.1. The list of the largest hundred
companies continued to evolve over the century, but, from 1919 to 1969, this list
was more stable than it had been in the first two decades of the century. Edwards
notes that during this period, corporations dropped out of the hundred largest list
at an average rate of only one per year. Id.
31 ARSENE PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESO-
LUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND
CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 1593, at 89 (1913). The Pujo Committee Report is the
2020] 647
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In the 1920s, economist Gardiner Means began assem-
bling data to help him measure the changing concentration of
economic power in the largest corporations.32 He found that,
as of 1909, gross assets of the 200 largest nonfinancial corpo-
rations constituted 42% of the estimated gross assets of all
nonfinancial corporations.33 By 1927, he estimated, the 200
largest nonfinancial corporations controlled about 57% of the
gross assets of all nonfinancial corporations.34 Merger activity
picked up again in the 1920s, and the share of gross assets
held by the 200 largest corporations continued to grow, reach-
ing almost 62% by 1929, according to Means.35 Large corpora-
tions were also growing faster, by an average of 5.4% per year
from 1909 to 1928, compared with an average of 3.6% per year
growth of all nonfinancial corporations.36
Despite these indications of the concentration of wealth
and power of large corporations, public concern about powerful
corporations abated in the 1920s.37 This may have been be-
cause consumers were enjoying the benefits of new technology
and new ways of organizing production in the form of cars,
electric power, radios, refrigeration, and a growing variety of
packaged foods and other consumer goods at affordable prices.
Large corporations were also turning out to be relatively stable
employers, who provided some welfare benefits for their work-
ers.38 And financial markets famously boomed in this decade,
so investors, too, were relatively sanguine about the dominance
of large corporations.39
Richard C. Edwards has argued that, by the early 1920s,
large firms had assumed dominant roles in "industries
processing or manufacturing food, tobacco, lumber and paper
earliest known attempt to assemble data to document the role played by boards of
directors in major sectors of the economy.
32 See Gardiner C. Means, The Growth in the Relative Importance of the Large
Corporation in American Economic Life, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 10, 21-23 (1931).
33 Although Means first generated estimates of the share of nonfinancial cor-
porate assets accounted for by the largest 200 corporations in Means, supra note
32, his results were refined and reported again in ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERLY bk. I, 36 tbl. III (1932).
Percentages represent author's calculations from Table III.
34 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA,
1880-1940: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY IN SOCIAL CHANGE 195 Fig. 7-2 (1975).
38 See SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE THE NEW
DEAL 20-26 (1997).
39 See generally GALAMBOS, supra note 37, at 191-222 (discussing the growing
acceptance of the role of large corporations in the 1920s).
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products, chemicals, petroleum, rubber, metals of all sorts,
farm and construction machinery, electrical machinery, com-
munications equipment, motor vehicles, and photographic
equipment," and that the overall industrial structure, as de-
fined by the largest corporations in the early 1920s, remained
in place into the 1970s.40 Gardiner Means shows that, by
1933, the value of nonfinancial corporation assets in the econ-
omy had fallen to $142 billion (from $177 billion in 1929), but
assets controlled by the 200 largest corporations grew to
around 55% of the assets of all nonfinancial corporations.4 1
These 200 firms, Edwards shows, were for the most part, the
largest firms in their sectors and largely survived to be domi-
nant firms in 1969.42 Beyond manufacturing, large firms had
also emerged by the early 1920s to dominate the transporta-
tion, utilities, insurance, and banking sectors, and to a lesser
extent merchandising.43
In 1936, Franklin Roosevelt cited the findings of Berle and
Means's famous 1932 book44 to make a very different point. He
focused on data showing the degree of concentration in the
corporate sector, and denounced monopoly in his 1936 presi-
dential campaign.4 5 In his acceptance speech at the Demo-
cratic National Convention that year, Roosevelt railed that
"[h]alf of the industrial corporate wealth of the country had
come under the control of less than two hundred huge corpora-
tions," that "[t]hese huge corporations in some cases did not
even try to compete with each other," and that they were gov-
erned by "interlocking directors, interlocking bankers, inter-
locking lawyers," so that "independent business was allowed to
exist only by sufferance."46 In 1938, Roosevelt sent a proposal
to Congress to undertake a "thorough study of the concentra-
tion of economic power in American industry and the effect of
40 Edwards, supra note 28, at 441.
41 GARDINER C. MEANS, THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A REPORT BY
THE INDUSTRIAL SECTION, NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMrITEE 290 app. 11, tbl. IV (1939).
Means's estimates of corporate assets in 1929 were adjusted again in his 1939
report, so the numbers here do not agree precisely with those published in BERLE
& MEANS, supra note 33.
42 Edwards, supra note 28, at 446 app. tbl. III.
43 Id. at 441.
44 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33.
45 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address: October 14, 1936, TEACHING AM.
HISTORY, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/campaign-ad-
dress/ [https://perma.cc/K8XH-TG68] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
46 Id.; see also Joseph L. weiner, The New Deal and the Corporation, 19 U.
CHI. L. REv. 724, 729 n.21 (1952).
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that concentration upon the decline of competition."47 Con-
gress created a Commission to undertake such a study, but,
within a few months after the report was delivered in 1941, the
United States was drawn into World War II by the bombing of
Pearl Harbor, and the federal government rapidly took effective
control of a large part of corporate productive capacity.48 The
Commission's report observed that major corporations had be-
come national, not local, institutions and should therefore be
chartered at the national level, a view that has been called the
"basic doctrine of the New Deal."49
The fact that United States industrial capacity was fairly
highly concentrated turned out to be a great advantage to the
war effort. Within a month after Pearl Harbor, in early 1942,
President Roosevelt told Congress that "We have the ability and
capacity to produce arms not only for our own forces but also
for the armies, navies, and air forces fighting on our side....
[M]odern methods of warfare make it a task not only of shooting
and fighting, but an even more urgent one of working and
producing," and our superiority "in munitions and ships must
be overwhelming."50 Thus he laid out his ambitions for what
the corporate sector must do: 60,000 aircraft in 1942, and
125,000 more in 1943; 120,000 tanks, and 55,000 antiaircraft
guns in the same period. "Without the cooperation of industry,
massive production would never get off the ground," historian
Doris Goodwin has observed.5 1
To pursue these goals, Roosevelt created the War Produc-
tion Board in 1942, and the Office of War Mobilization in 1943,
and by the end of the War, industrial productivity had in-
creased by 96%, and corporate profits had doubled. The war
effort provided the demand that finally pulled the U.S. economy
out of the depressed state it had been in during the 1930s, and
the federal government, through the Reconstruction Finance
Corp., provided the financing. This productive power was
47 TEMP. NAT'L ECON. COMM., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC
POWER, S. Doc. NO. 77-35, at 11, 16 (1st Sess. 1941).
48 Weiner, supra note 46, at 731; see also Doris Goodwin, The Way We Won:
America's Economic Breakthrough During World War H, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19,
2001), https://prospect.org/article/way-we-won-americas-economic-break-
through-during-world-war-il [https://perma.c/A44N-TMRK].
49 Weiner, supra note 46, at 734.
50 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 6, 1942),
https: / /web.viu.ca/davies/H324War/FDR.message. Congress.Jan6.1942.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z6UD-RYEH].
51 Goodwin, supra note 48.
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highly concentrated in the largest corporations, however.52
Moreover, scientific and technical developments associated
with the war effort were also highly concentrated in the largest
corporations. After the war, this technology was almost imme-
diately put to work by the private sector.
Economists and policymakers thus continued to be inter-
ested in the role of big business, the concentration of economic
power and the "monopoly problem."53 In 1949, the Federal
Trade Commission published a report that found that, as of
1947, 113 manufacturing corporations held assets of over
$100 million each, and that these corporations together ac-
counted for 46% of the total assets held by manufacturing
firms.54 Responding to this study, and to earlier work (cited
above) by Gardiner Means, economist M.A. Adelman undertook
a careful analysis of various measures of the concentration of
industrial activity.55 Adelman measured concentration using
three measures: the share of nonfinancial corporate assets
held by the largest 200 corporations, the share of total employ-
ment in firms that are large employers, and the share of value
added by the largest manufacturing corporations compared
with value added by all manufacturing corporations. Adelman
also made a number of assumptions and calculations to try to
estimate the share of assets held by the largest 200 corpora-
tions, in order to produce a number comparable to the esti-
mates produced by Means in the 1930s, and concluded that
the largest 200, as of 1947, held somewhere between 40.3%
and 43.3% of total nonfinancial corporate assets.56
Thus we have estimates of the ratio of the total assets of the
200 largest corporations to the assets of all nonfinancial corpo-
rations ranging from 42% in 1909, to 62% in 1929 (although
this measure appears to be an outlier), and back down to 40%
in 1947.57 It is difficult to know whether assets of the largest
corporations relative to aggregate assets of the corporate sector
actually changed that much, or whether the differences are the
result of different sources of data and different simplifying as-
sumptions made by the economists who estimated them.
52 EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 19,
24-25 (1957).
53 Id.
54 FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTIVE FACILITIES
16 (1947).
55 See M.A. Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 269, 269 (1951).
56 Id. at 276.
57 Id.; BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33, at bk. I, 36 tbl. III.
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Whether or not the degree of concentration was excessive
in some sense, the economy dominated by large publicly traded
corporations performed quite well during the War, and contin-
ued to perform well after the War in converting to production
for consumers. The standard of living of most Americans rose
during this period, and admiration for business corporations
was so widespread in the 1950s that even Adolf Berle dropped
his prior concern about excessive concentration.58 He cited the
studies by Adelman and others, which showed that the largest
200 corporations represented roughly 45% of all nonfinancial
corporate assets, a level of concentration that had seemed
troublesome in the 1930s. By the late 1950s, the level of con-
centration had not increased significantly, and Berle no longer
seemed to think it was a problem.5 9 In fact, he came to regard
it as beneficent. "It has probably enhanced the rate of indus-
trial progress, and has stimulated pioneering and fundamental
research which such corporations alone can do," John Lintner
said, describing Berle's changed attitude.60 Berle was also en-
couraged that the leaders of large corporations had become
"statesmen" who exercised their power "in conformity with the
evolving social conscience of the people."6 1
In 1955, Fortune magazine began compiling and reporting
its annual list of the Fortune 500 corporations, and the Federal
Trade Commission began tracking and collecting data on merg-
ers and acquisitions.6 2 Congress also held hearings into ques-
tions about corporate mergers and the resulting growth and
market power of large corporations. In 1958, the Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Judiciary Committee of
the U.S. Senate produced a report on concentration in indus-
tries, utilizing plant-level data collected in the Census of Manu-
factures for 1947 and 1954.63 These data showed that as of
1947, the 200 largest manufacturing corporations in the
United States accounted for 30% of value added in manufac-
turing, while by 1954, the comparable number had risen to
37%.
58 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 42
(1954).
59 See John Lintner, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 166-201 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
60 Id. at 170.
61 Id.
62 A Database of 50 Years of Fortune's List of America's Largest Corporations,
CNN MONEY, https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/
full/ 1955/index.html [https://perma.cc/349H-52RP] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).




In 1962, the Subcommittee updated its figures based on
1958 Census of Manufactures numbers and in a follow-up re-
port, found that the 200 largest manufacturing corporations
were responsible for 38% of value added.64 In another report
by this same subcommittee in 1964, one expert testified that,
by 1962, the 200 largest manufacturing corporations ac-
counted for 56.8% of all manufacturing assets, and for 67.5%
of all profits after taxes earned by all manufacturing firms.
65 In
1965 other scholars produced estimates for the Antitrust Com-
mittee of the share of manufacturing assets held by the 200
largest manufacturing corporations in 1962, with Mueller find-
ing 54.6% this time,66 and Everette MacIntyre finding 57.2% as
of 1966.67
II
NEW CHALLENGES FOR LARGE CORPORATIONS,
1965-PRESENT
By the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, mergers and
acquisitions had become a regular part of the way that corpora-
tions and corporate economic activity evolved over time.68 In
the 1960s, conglomerate mergers represented a growing share
of this activity.69 Not surprisingly, Congressional interest in
conglomerates was piqued, and leading economists from gov-
ernment and academia were brought in to testify at hearings of
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in 1965.70
These economists produced a variety of studies in an attempt
to quantify what was happening. Gardiner Means testified that
manufacturing concentration had increased substantially over
64 Id.
65 Economic Concentration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Mo-
nopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 115 tbl.2 (2d Sess. 1964)
(statement of Willard F. Mueller, Director, Bureau of Econ., FTC).
66 Economic Concentration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Mo-
nopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 519 (1st Sess. 1965) (statement
of Willard F. Mueller, Director, Bureau of Econ., FTC).
67 Economic Concentration: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Comm on the Judiciary, Part 8: The Congolomerate Merger Prob-
lem, 91st Cong. 5187 (2nd Sess. 1970).
68 See Economic Concentration, supra note 65, at 124 tbl.7. Mueller suggests
that over one-third of the disappearing companies between 1950 and 1963 were
acquired by the 200 largest corporations in 1950, and that the assets of the firms
acquired by these 200 corporations represented about 66% of the total assets of
all acquisitions involving the 1,000 largest corporations of 1950. He also stated
that between 1951 and 1963, the 200 largest manufacturing corporations made
at least 1,956 acquisitions. See id.
69 MARGARET M. BLAIR & GIRISH UPPAL, THE DEAL DECADE HANDBOOK 62 (1993).
70 Economic Concentration, supra note 65.
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the previous three decades.7 1 This was a problem, he argued,
because in a growing share of industries, prices in the economy
were "administered" or dictated by large organizations, rather
than determined in competitive markets, a fact that directly
contradicted key assumptions behind the view that a "capital-
ist" or free market economy would produce and deliver goods in
the most efficient way. In many parts of the economy, he ar-
gued, there were no free and competitive markets, so markets
could not be relied upon as the mechanism in the economy for
maintaining full employment and avoiding inflation. Means'
conclusion from these observations was that big business must
be balanced by government regulation in markets to address
these issues.
Other expert witnesses fretted that "large conglomerate en-
terprise[s] may have significant power."7 2 That power made it
possible for corporations to use profits made in one business to
cross subsidize activities in another business, and thereby un-
fairly compete away market share. "A big firm has advantages
over a smaller rival just because it is big," economist Corwin
Edwards testified. 73 Others presented data showing that as
concentration goes up, turnover among the top corporations
declines so that leaders in specific industries become less sub-
ject to challenge by competitors.74
Notably almost no one in this period expressed concern
that the problem with big corporations was that corporate
managers were unaccountable to shareholders as a result of
the separation of ownership from control. "With the exception
of a highly polemical study by another Marxist economist,
Victor Perlo, there were virtually no published critiques of
managerialism between 1932 and 1970," according to sociolo-
gist Mark Mizruchi. 75
In an effort to assess whether competition was being
harmed by mergers in general, and conglomerate mergers in
particular, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began tracking
data on mergers and acquisitions from about 1955, and contin-
ued to collect these data through 1979. By the 1980s, private
71 Id. at 17 (statement of Gardiner C. Means, economist) ("These estimates,
though less reliable than those for 1929, suggest that there has been a very
considerable increase in concentration in manufacturing as a whole in the last 33
years.").
72 Id. at 42 (statement of Corwin D. Edwards).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 64 (statement of Lee E. Preston).
75 See Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and
Power of Large U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY & Soc'Y 579, 587 (2004).
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ways to track the share of economic activity accounted for by
large corporations.
Figure 2 reports a simple count of the number of publicly
traded nonfinancial corporations chartered in the United
States and trading on U.S. stock exchanges, as tracked by
Compustat since 1960.
FIG. 2
















This figure dramatically illustrates the basic facts that
have motivated some scholars to be concerned about the "de-
cline" of publicly traded corporations in the last few years.
There has been an undeniable decline in the number of U.S.
nonfinancial corporations listed and traded in U.S. stock mar-
kets from the peak during the dot-com boom in the late 1990s.
Moreover, there has also been a decline in the number of corpo-
rations "going public" through initial public offerings, as illus-
trated in Figure 3.
through WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS. (WRDS), wrds.wharton.upenn.edu [https://
perma.cc/N9BJ-SS23 (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
82 Author's calculations based on Wharton Research Data Services.
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But what should we make of this decline? Are publicly
traded corporations indeed becoming less important to eco-
nomic activity in the United States? I believe the answer to this
is no. As the discussion below shows, large publicly traded
corporations have continued to account for about the same
share of economic activity, as measured in a variety of ways, as
they have since the 1960s.
To address this question, I extracted annual data on total
assets, total revenues, total employment, and total market cap-
italization for publicly traded nonfinancial corporations
tracked by Compustat, for every year since 1960, and identified
the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations by each of these
measures for each year.84 I then aggregated the data for each
year, and compared the top 200 firm totals to economy-wide
data from the Federal Reserve Board, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, and other official sources.
In Figure 4, for example, we see that the total assets of the
200 largest nonfinancial corporations tracked by Compustat
represented 26% of total nonfinancial corporate business as-
83 Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics (Dec. 31, 2018),
https: / /site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2019/01 /IPOs2018Statistics_Dec
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YJE-Q7WZ].
84 I looked at the top 200 to correspond with estimates by prior scholars of the
share of economic activity that flowed through the largest corporations. Although
Compustat data go back to 1955 for many corporations, there were many missing
values in the data prior to about 1960.
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a crushing effort by the Federal Reserve to break inflation in
the 1980s.9 1
U.S. corporations also began to face serious competition
from corporations in Europe and Japan in the 1970s. Not sur-
prisingly, the effect of these problems was reflected in a sorry
performance of corporations in financial markets. An invest-
ment of $1,000 in the S&P 500 on January 1, 1969, would only
have been worth $1,109 by January 1, 1980, a growth in value
of only 0.84% per year, in nominal terms, for the whole dec-
ade.92 With inflation taken into account, this represented a
loss of more than 50% in purchasing power terms. Low and
negative corporate profits were reflected in the decline in the
value of debt plus equity of the 200 largest corporations
(Figures 6 and 7), which reached $545.93 billion in nominal
terms in 1972, then declined to as low as $344.38 billion in
1974, and did not recover, even in nominal terms, until 1979,
when the equity value of the 200 largest corporations reached
$563.63 billion. As a share of all nonfinancial corporate assets,
the value of debt plus equity of these corporations fell from 25%
in 1972 to 10.5% in 1979, then recovered very slowly, not get-
ting above 25% again until 1995, as shown in Figure 7. Merger
activity also slowed from the 1960s, and remained low
throughout the 1970s, as seen in Figures 1-A and 1-B above.
The overall poor performance of the corporate sector during
this decade laid the groundwork for dramatic changes to come
in the next decade.
The 1980s began with an economic crisis. Inflation
reached the highest levels of the post WWII period, 12.5% in
1980, and nearly 9% in 1981.93 Facing growing popular fear of
uncontrollable inflation, the Federal Reserve Board increased
interest rates in late 1978, pushing the Federal Funds Rate (the
rate that is directly controlled by the Fed, and that forms the
91 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU LAB.
STAT. (Sept. 14, 2019), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [https://
perma.cc/F4J5-YQUV:; Michael Bryan, The Great Inflation, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov.
22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-inflation [https:/
/perma.cc/9H67-2SS5]; see also Tim McMahon, Historical Inflation Rate, INFiA-
TIONDATA, https://inflationdata.com/Inflation/InflationRate/HistoricalInfla-
tion.aspx [https://perma.cc/J7SN-ZFX3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
92 Author's calculation is from data on historical prices of S&P 500 index.
See S&P 500 Historical Prices by Year, supra note 79. The calculated growth in
nominal value does not include dividends, which would have added another 2.5%
per year, on average, to the nominal return on investment, still a startlingly low
rate of return in real terms, given the high rate of inflation in this decade.
93 McMahon, supra note 91.
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baseline for other rates) to 10%.94 Inflation continued, un-
abated. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter appointed Paul
Volcker to be chairman of the Federal Reserve. Volcker decided
to do whatever it took to bring down inflation. Under his lead-
ership, the Fed raised the Federal Funds Rate to 15% in Octo-
ber of 1979, then to 20% in March of 1980, precipitating a mild
recession in the first half of 1980.95 But inflation stayed high.
The Fed allowed the Federal Funds Rate to decline for a while in
1980, but raised it again to 20% in December of 1980. The
economy sank back into recession in 1981; this time, unem-
ployment shot up to nearly 11% by 1982. The Fed kept the
Federal Funds Rate between 15% and 20% until April of 1982.
The result was the worst recession since the Great Depression,
officially dated from July 1981 to November 1982.96 Unem-
ployment stayed high for a number of years, but the Fed kept
nominal interest rates high even as inflation finally slowed
down.97
"Manufacturing states were battered by the downturn," the
Economist has said of this period.98 The unemployment rate in
Michigan, for example, reached almost 17%. "Mortgage lenders
were devastated by high interest rates. The banking system
was pushed to the point of insolvency. Things were quite bad,"
the Economist added.99
Extraordinarily high interest rates of the first half of the
1980s, coming immediately on the heels of a long decade of low
returns for investors in publicly traded corporations, created a
highly problematic situation for investors. The cost of capital
for new investment, which is driven by interest rates, was so
high for most of the 1980s that it exceeded the rate of return
investors were receiving on existing investments in many in-
94 Kimberly Amadeo, Fed Funds Rate History with Its Highs, Lows, and
Charts, BALANCE (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/fed-funds-rate-
history-highs-lows-3306135 [https://perma.cc/63Y9-LF2G].
95 Id.
96 See U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU ECON.
REs., https://www.nber.org/cycles.html [https://perma.cc/F4G9-68H6] (last
visited Jan. 17, 2020).
97 See Labor Force Statistics, supra note 91; Labor Force, Employment and
Unemployment, 1929-1939: Estimating Methods: U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS,
Thls. 1.1.1, 1.1.5 (Aug. 29, 2019), https://apps.bea.gov/national/pdf/SNT-
ables.pdf [https://perma.c/5J23-L3MV]; Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED.
RES. BANK ST. Louis (Sept. 3, 2019), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
FEDFUNDS [https://perma.cc/Z7C4-MU9G; see also Amadeo, supra note 94.
98 Ryan Avent, The Volcker Recession: Who Beat Inflation?, ECONOMIST





dustries.100 The result was that, for corporations in many in-
dustries, cash flow being generated by corporations could not
be profitably reinvested in the same businesses. Investors
could earn more by investing in "risk-free" U.S. Treasury secur-
ities. On the basis of estimates I made in the 1990s, this situa-
tion prevailed for most of the 1980s, with economic
fundamentals signaling to investors that they should disinvest
from corporations and move their funds to Treasury securities
or other low-risk investments. Not surprisingly, this led to dra-
matic changes in the 1980s in the structure and governance of
corporations, which I have explored in other work.10 1
This turmoil in the corporate sector in the 1980s is not
obviously reflected in the share of aggregate economic activity
reported in Figures 4-7 above. But it was reflected in a new
phenomenon: hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts.
We can see from Figures 1-A and 1-B that merger activity
took off in the 1980s. Activity was high for both horizontal
mergers and unrelated mergers. Behind the aggregate merger
data was a rapid increase in indebtedness of the corporate
sector as it financed acquisitions with debt, especially with
high-risk bonds called "junk bonds." Aggressive takeover tac-
tics, in which would-be acquiring corporations made "tender
offers" directly to investors to try to acquire a controlling posi-
tion in the target corporation without the support of target firm
management (these transactions were often called "hostile
takeovers") became common. Corporate managers responded
by deploying takeover defenses if they feared they might be-
come targets of hostile offers. And existing managers of corpo-
rations undertook debt-financed transactions in which
publicly traded corporations repurchased shares in self-tender
offers.10 2 From 1980 through 1989, 478 publicly traded corpo-
rations, with a total value of $170 billion (1987 dollars), were
taken private via such private buyouts, and an additional 559
subsidiaries or units of publicly traded corporations, with a
total value of over $80 billion (1987 dollars), were spun off from
100 See Margaret M. Blair & Robert E. Litan, Corporate Leverage and Lever-
aged Buyouts in the Eighties, in DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 58
(John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990). The cost of capital for a corporation
is generally thought to be equal to the "risk-free" rate of interest (such as the
Federal Funds Rate), adjusted upwards to account for risk.
101 See id.; see also Margaret M. Blair, Financial Restructuring and the Debate
about Corporate Governance, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED
BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1-18 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993).
102 See generally BLAIR & UPPAL, supra note 69 (providing extensive data docu-
menting these trends during the "deal decade" of the 1980s).
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parent corporations and taken private.103 Corporations that
went private via these "leveraged buyouts" nearly always sold
off substantial assets after the buyout in order to pay down the
debt. Many of these transactions had the effect of undoing
conglomerate mergers that had taken place in the 1960s and
1970s.10 4 This breaking up of some of the largest conglomer-
ates contributed to an increase in the total number of publicly
traded corporations, from about 2,600 in 1980 to about 3,400
in 1990 (See Figure 2).
Reeling from the waves of restructuring in the 1980s, cor-
porate executives and policy makers began fretting about
whether U.S. corporations could still be "competitive" in inter-
national markets.105 Executives and directors of many long-
dominant corporations complained that they could not com-
pete with corporations in other countries where labor costs
were lower. Labor leaders and politicians complained that U.S.
corporations were failing to invest and innovate to stay compet-
itive. Commissions and advisory councils were formed to study
103 Id.
104 Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert w. Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in
the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, in 1990 BRoOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVIlY, MICROECONOMICS 1, 2 (1990) ("By and large, hostile takeovers re-
present the deconglomeration of American business and a return to corporate
specialization."); see also Gerald F. Davis, Kristina Diekmann & Catherine Tins-
ley, The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitution-
alization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 547 (1994).
105 Many factors have been cited as possible causes of competitiveness
problems, but it is widely agreed that the problems have their origins in changes
that occurred in the 1980s. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PORTER, JAN W. RIVKIN &
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, COMPEITIVENESS AT A CROSSROADS: FINDINGS OF HARVARD
BUSINESS SCHOOL'S 2012 SURVEY ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS 3 (2013), https://
www.hbs. edu/competitiveness/Documents/competitiveness-at-a-crossroads.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CZ2G-7XNW] (noting that "the roots of America's competitive-
ness challenge . . . [began] in the late 1970s and the 1980s, when changes in
geopolitics and technology dramatically broadened the geographic scope of com-
petition"). For an argument hat the high cost of capital during that era was a
competitiveness problem, see G.N. HATSOPOULOS, Technology and the Cost of Eq-
uity Capital, in TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS (1991). For an analysis of the effect of
corporate takeovers, see Alfred D. Chandler, Competitiveness and Capital Invest-
ment: The Restructuring of U.S. Industry, 1960-1990, 68 BuS. HIST. REV. Ix (1994);
Bronwyn H. Hall, Corporate Restructuring and Investment Horizons in the United
States, 1976-1987, 68 BUS. Hisr. REV. 110 (1994). See generally Michael E.
Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, 5 J. AP-
PLIED CORP. FIN. 4 (1992) (examining how private capital is allocated in the United
States, Japan, and Germany, and the relative effectiveness of corporate govern-
ance practices in the United States); Gary P. Pisano & Willy C. Shih, Restoring
American Competitiveness, HARV. BUS. REV. (July-Aug. 2009), https://hbr.org/
2009/07/restoring-american-competitiveness [https://perma.cc/8SU6-F6AP]
(arguing that collective R&D, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities of U.S.
corporations must be rebuilt).
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the "competitiveness problem."106 Few of these studies pointed
to excessively high interest rates as an important factor driving
the restructuring. As corporations cut back and restructured,
however, working people across the country, by the hundreds
of thousands, were laid off from jobs that had provided good
pay and benefits, and were forced to try to find new work in an
economy that was undergoing a transition that even the ex-
perts did not fully understand.
What corporate employees and managers saw as turmoil
and disruption in the 1980s was good news to the financial
investors who were funding these restructurings. The S&P 500
Index rose by threefold from 107.94 at the end of 1979 to
353.40 on December 31, 1989.107 Much of this new value was
apparently coming from smaller and medium-sized corpora-
tions, however, because the value of debt plus equity of the 200
largest corporations grew only modestly relative to GDP in the
1980s, and did not even recover the highs set in the 1960s.
(See Figure 6).
Two other changes were underway in the corporate sector
in the 1980s. The "separation of ownership and control" that
had been highlighted by Berle and Means early in the cen-
tury10 8 was undergoing a long slow reversal, as financial insti-
tutions such as retirement plans, mutual funds, insurance
companies, and trusts and endowments came to own larger
and larger shares of the typical corporation. As shareholdings
became more concentrated, shareholders began to seek and
gain more power in corporate governance.109 Financial inter-
ests, in the form of takeover investors (pejoratively called "raid-
ers"), found new ways in the 1980s to finance efforts to acquire
control of target corporations. Managements and boards of
target corporations found new ways to resist those efforts. Tar-
get company managers and boards argued that they needed to
protect corporate enterprises from the "raiders," who, it was
asserted, just wanted to strip assets out of the corporations for
106 The Council on competitiveness, a nonpartisan organization of business,
labor, academic, and government leaders, for example, was formed in 1986. The
Competitiveness Policy Council was an independent federal advisory council,
formed under the authority of the Competitiveness Policy Council Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4801, passed in 1988. Both organizations produced a number of reports in the
late 1980s and 1990s.
107 See, e.g., Macrotrends S&P 500 Index-90 Year Historical Chart,
MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/2324/sp-500-historical-chart-data
[https://perma.cc/292G-WCRW] (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
108 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33, at bk. 1, 5.




quick profits.110 Takeover investors argued that it was the duty
of managers and boards to "maximize share value" for the cor-
poration's shareholders, and that this required that sharehold-
ers be able to sell their shares to the takeover investors, who
were willing to pay higher prices.111
Thus the legal question at issue involved who should de-
cide whether a takeover offer should be accepted? More
broadly, who should have control over corporations, and in
what situations? And what are controllers required to do? Tar-
get company managers won some rounds, and were permitted
by courts to take some protective actions. But courts articu-
lated circumstances in which managers could no longer resist
a takeover offer, but must negotiate to get the highest price
they could for shareholders in a sale of control of the corpora-
tion.11 2 Over the course of the decade, managers and boards of
nearly every publicly traded corporation came to understand
that if they did not ensure shareholders a high enough return,
outside investors now had the tools to get control and to
squeeze out higher returns for themselves.
The effect of this battle over hostile takeovers was a dra-
matic change in the culture inside corporations to emphasize
returns to shareholders over all other corporate goals. Com-
pensation packages of senior managers were restructured to
give them powerful incentives to try to increase the prices at
which the company's shares were trading, and notions that
corporations had obligations to their employees, or to the com-
munities where they operated, or to any other social goals, were
largely abandoned.113 The prices that corporate shares traded
for in financial markets were deemed to be the only valid mea-
sure of whether corporate managers and directors were doing a
good job. And as the corporate sector adjusted to these new
rules of the game, the value of corporate securities on the stock
markets rose substantially, providing strong returns for share-
holders and affirmation for those who argued in support of
"shareholder primacy."
110 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment Explaining Anoma-
lies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 737 (2006).
111 Margaret M. Blair, What Must Corporate Directors Do? Maximizing Share-
holder Value Versus Creating Value Through Team Production, BROOKINGS 1, 3
(June 15, 2015), https://www.brooklngs.edu/research/what-must-corporate-di-
rectors-do-maximizing-shareholder-value-versus-creating-value-through-team-
production/ [https://perma.cc/5YRV-TDGQ].
112 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986).
113 Blair, supra note 111, at 4.
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Going into the 1990s, the debates about corporate govern-
ance and takeovers continued, but the corporate restructuring
underway in the 1980s and early 1990s produced a new wave
of changes. As takeover investors bought control and took ex-
isting older companies private, huge amounts of cash were
being paid out to the shareholders who were being bought out.
From the end of 1983 through the end of 1990, publicly traded
corporations bought back $632 billion more of their equity
than they issued-a withdrawal of capital from the publicly
traded corporate sector that was unprecedented.114 This flood
of money flowing out of the publicly traded corporate sector
was thereby freed up to be used to finance a rapidly emerging
venture capital sector of tech start-ups and dot-com compa-
nies. These companies, in turn, began to tap into the financial
markets by going public through "initial public offerings"
(IPOs). Over the course of the 1990s, the number of IPOs, and
the dollar value of funds raised through IPOs, increased nearly
every year. (See Figure 3). The value of many newly listed dot-
com companies soared, as investors got excited about the busi-
ness possibilities opened up by the internet.115 This, in turn,
encouraged more tech companies, and more investors to do
even more IPOs. From 1990 through 1994, 1,720 corporations
went public, raising aggregate proceeds of $90.91 billion, more
than had ever been raised via IPOs in any prior five-year period.
Then, from 1995 through 1999, another 2,370 corporations
went public, raising an aggregate of $200.36 billion. The NAS-
DAQ index, which included most of these new publicly traded
corporations, went from 415.8 on Jan. 1, 1990, to 3940.35 on
Jan. 1, 2000, an increase of more than nine-fold in ten
years.116 To say that the financial markets were giddy over the
dot-com IPOs is an understatement. The NASDAQ index
114 BLAIR & UPPAL, supra note 69, at 8. The payout of capital from publicly
traded corporations to their shareholders has been substantial in recent years
too. See, e.g., William Lazonick, The New Normal is "Maximizing Shareholder
Value": Predatory Value Extraction, Slowing Productivity, and the Vanishinng
American Middle Class, 46 Ivr'L J. POL. ECON. 217 (2017); Mark DeCambre, Stock




115 Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics, UNIV. FLA. 1, 3
(Mar. 8, 2016), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2016/03/Initial-Pub-
lic-Offerings-Updated-Statistics-2016-03-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QM2-
7C5Q].
116 NASDAQ Composite Index, FED. RES. BANK ST. LouIs, https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM [https://perma.cc/KG5L-QGUL] (last
visited Aug. 19, 2019).
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peaked the next month, in February of 2000, at 4696.69. Then
the air started to come out. It became clear that many of the
newly public companies would not meet their lofty revenue
projections, much less their earnings projections, and the bub-
ble collapsed.
The "dot-com bubble" and bust is easily seen Figure 2
above, which shows the number of publicly traded nonfinancial
corporations tracked by Compustat in each year from 1965
through 2017. This number rose rapidly from 1990 to 1996,
peaking at about 4,600. The number has declined since then,
and was at 3,106 in 2017.117 Other scholars have written
about this decline, raising questions about whether the pub-
licly traded corporation is becoming obsolete, or disappearing,
or at least is no longer an attractive vehicle for organizing eco-
nomic activity.118 But, one way to understand these data is to
view the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and
the financial crisis of 2008-2009, as the aberrations (or, per-
haps, spasms of an economy in transition). The number of
publicly traded corporations is about the same now as it was in
1985, but the largest corporations continue to account for
about the same share of economic activity as they have for
most of the last six decades.
Data reported in the figures above provide some measures
of what happened to the top 200 corporations relative to the
economy as a whole in the 1990s. We see that, in the 1990s,
the ratio of value of debt plus equity of the top 200 corporations
to GDP (Figure 6) rose from 28% to over 90% by 1999. For all
nonfinancial publicly traded corporations, which would in-
clude many of the newly-listed dot-com companies, the value of
debt plus equity relative to GDP rose from 39% in 1990 to
122% in 1999. In other words, by the end of the 1990s, the
financial markets assigned significantly more value to the se-
curities issued by publicly traded corporations than the esti-
mated value of all the goods and services produced in the
economy as a whole for that year. Part of this value, as it
became clear during the market bust in 2000-2002, was a
bubble. But some part of that new value was, and still is, real.
117 Author's calculations are based on Compustat Annual Updates, WHARTON
RES. DATA SERVS., wrds.wharton.upenn.edu [https://perma.cc/P8HG-EBRY] (last
visited Aug. 19, 2019).
118 See sources cited supra notes 2 and 3; see also Isabelle Martinez & Stepha-
nie Serve, Reasons for Delisting and Consequences: A Literature Review and Re-
search Agenda, 31 J. ECON. SURVS. 733 (2017).
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porate sector in the last half century suggests at least two
reasons. The first is that the 1980s marked the beginning of a
movement by the publicly traded sector away from investing in
hard assets, such as factories, toward investing in intangible
assets such as patents and software. The 1990s saw a gold
rush in technology investments. Financial markets had ex-
tracted a huge amount of money from the publicly traded sec-
tor in the 1980s, and they were looking for attractive places to
put that money to work. The changes being wrought by the
internet revolution were just beginning to be appreciated in the
1990s, and this new, exciting field attracted a substantial
amount of this money. Some of the new ideas were funded by
the public market through IPOs-the number of IPOs peaked
in 1996 at 677. This helped drive up the total number of corpo-
rations listed in Compustat, which rose by 47% from 1987 to
the peak of 4,509 nonfinancial corporations in 1996. At the
same time, many other new ideas were being funded privately
through venture capital funds.
The collapse in stock market values after 1999 followed the
pattern of numerous past financial bubbles. Valuations of
"dot-com" companies reached absurd heights in the late 1990s,
but eventually, reality began to set in, and as Professor Lynn
Stout has taught us in much of her work on speculative mar-
kets, financial markets often overreact on the upside, and then
also overreact on the downside.121 The S&P 500 index fell from
a peak of 1,525 in August of 2000 to a low of 788.9 in March of
2003. The effect was to wipe out much of the supposed new
value. IPO activity collapsed to only sixty-three in 2003, and
the number of publicly traded corporations tracked by Compu-
stat fell 18% by 2002, to 3,686, and has continued to decline
since then, as seen in Figure 2.
In other words, the decline in the number of IPOs and in
the number of publicly traded corporations since 2000 can be
seen as a correction after a period of excess exuberance in the
market. Since 2000, the new corporations that truly had viable
business models (such as Facebook, Google, Amazon) have
grown enormously, while other innovative corporations were
either swallowed up by the successful corporations, or turned
out not to have a viable business model. Nothing in this pro-
cess suggests that the corporate sector is disappearing or even
in decline. As we have seen above, the corporations that re-
121 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 649 (1995).
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main publicly traded continue to account for at least as much
economic activity as they have since the 1960s.
The second potential cause of the sweeping changes dis-
cussed above is that the financial markets have become ex-
traordinarily good at pulling assets out of disfavored
corporations and industries and redeploying the assets into
new corporations that seem to be more promising. Since 2002,
the corporate sector has been going through a long period of
sorting out which ideas and business models in the new econ-
omy are viable, and truly bring new value to the economy, and
which parts need to be discarded. At the same time, the best
business models are being consolidated under the control of
fewer corporations.
Remarkably, throughout this process, the largest corpora-
tions, while undergoing substantial restructuring and turno-
ver, continue to account for a significant share of total
economic activity, whether that is measured by the value of
their assets, or their revenues relative to GDP, or the market
value of their equity and debt. I see no indication that large
publicly traded corporations are relinquishing this role.
CONCLUSION
Large corporations, especially publicly traded corpora-
tions, are as important to the overall economy in the United
States as they have been since the merger movement at the end
of the nineteenth century. The details of which corporations
and which technologies account for the most economic activity
have changed over time. In the last four decades, it is possible
that the turnover rate in the corporate sector may have in-
creased, at least from what it was from the mid-1930s into the
1970s. It is not clear yet whether the new giant corporations in
the internet, communications, and computer technology in-
dustries that have elbowed older industrial corporations out as
the leading employers, repositories of wealth, and contributors
to GDP will continue to dominate the economy, or whether they
will also be pushed out in due time by the gales of technological
change. But what does seem clear to me is that this remarka-
ble institution that Lynn Stout devoted much of her career to
studying and critiquing will continue to be an important object
of study for many years to come.
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